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SUMMARY
CONCEPTUALISING CRISIS, REFUGEES AND IDPs\ M. RUDOLF
This Working Paper assesses how humanitarian and development aid agencies address  
individuals whose human rights and human dignity have been affected by displacement.  
It proposes a fresh look at how to measure needs that arise in such situations. To this end, the 
Paper evaluates characteristic needs regarding livelihoods, rights and basic services for displaced 
persons in an empirical study of so-called protracted refugee situations (PRS). The needs are 
then contrasted with the international legal category of ‘refugee’ and the descriptive definition 
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) used by aid agencies to address situations of displacement.  
Following empirical observations and drawing from existing models, the study establishes an 
inter-subjectively comprehensible catalogue of needs, i.e. land, employment (livelihoods),  
housing, social inclusion, nutrition, health, community assets, social networks, education, legal 
aid, political rights, legal documents, human rights. It is argued that these indicators need to be 
evaluated in regard to the degree of access displaced persons have (from no access to full access). 
The weighted indicators establish different points of reference to measure the detrimental im-
pact of displacement on human dignity. Assessment of aid for displaced persons thereby reaches 
beyond the pre-displacement situation as a central point of reference: This would enable  
humanitarian and development actors to evaluate their contribution to facilitating a dignified 
life of individuals more accurately, as a return to the status quo ante does not automatically 
mean that aid was successful—e.g. a return to misery.  
Drawing on field research findings in northern Iraq, moreover, the Paper argues that any  
indicator-based-approach must be combined with an analysis of the socio-political and historical 
context of forced migration and also pay attention to impacts on the host society. In line with 
empirical examples, the Working Paper argues that humanitarian and development aid agencies 
need to start from a long-term, multi-sectoral, whole-of-society, and systematically indicator- 
based approach—even though it is inevitable to prioritise some issues (and disregard others) in 
situations of crisis.  
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Humanitarian agencies need to identify, 
measures and address the impacts of 
displacement comprehensively by  
dissecting and assessing effects that 
are potentially, and to various degrees, 
detrimental to a life in dignity. 
Not only those who (have the chance to) reach 
out for help need humanitarian aid. On the contrary, 
many persons who would theoretically be eligible for 
aid do not attract the attention of humanitarian 
agencies.
Any assessment of needs has to start 
from a long-term, multi-sectoral, 
whole-of-society and systematically 
indicator-based approach.  
Any indicator-based approach must be combined 
with an analysis of the socio-political and historical 
context of forced migration and also pay attention to 
impacts on the host society. Even though it is inevitable 
in a situation of crisis to prioritise some issues (and 
disregard others), there is still no alternative to a 
holistic approach.  
Humanitarian aid is required in all 
situations where humanitarian 
principles are violated or where human 
dignity and rights are in danger.  
In northern Iraq, many persons do not leave their 
place of living and endure hardships, violence and  
insecurity as long as they manage to care for their 
families. They move away from their places to seek  
assistance only when they have lost access to any 
means of providing for their families. This shows  
that in reality, it is impossible to make an accurate 
distinction between people who are displaced due to 
war and those displaced for economic reasons; they 
should all be eligible for humanitarian assistance. 
The threshold for escaping from  
violence or migrating is usually related 
to a combination of factors that are 
specific to each situation, such as  
personal security or the lack of  
perspectives, regarding social, political 
and human rights issues.  
 
A high level of resilience in the face of insecurity 
and violence is common before and after displacement. 
Due to concrete hardships,  Yezidis, Christians, Shia, 
Sunni, etc. are sceptical about the possibility of future  
coexistence but still stay put. 
Main findings
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Protracted situations differ considerably between 
long and shorter periods of displacement. Long-term 
displacement implies that generations are born into 
situations of displacement rather than being displaced. 
Temporary situations are institutionalised and stabi-
lised over time (e.g. in camps) so that they appear 
more stable than the situation of individuals who 
move on—and out of the camps. Individuals experi-
ence cyclical and multiple displacements, internal 
and international displacement and the oscillation 
between registered and unregistered situations, for 
example, when a regular refugee in a camp becomes 
an irregular urban refugee. It, therefore, makes more 
sense to speak about ‘displaced persons’ in a broader 
sense than referring to refugees or IDPs. Hence, the 
term displaced persons refers here to persons who  
regard themselves as displaced involuntarily— 
regardless of the status attributed to them afterwards 
and regardless of their final or temporary destination. 
They usually have been forced to leave a location 
(place of origin) due to violent conflicts, persecution, 
environmental disasters or relocation schemes. 
To do justice to displaced persons’ experience, 
the research focus in this Working Paper is on  
‘protracted displacement dynamics’ (PDD). Looking 
into the dynamics of displacement sheds light on  
the wider direct and indirect impacts of protracted 
displacement—e.g. effects on the economy, the 
job market or the provision of basic services of the 
regions receiving displaced people.4  Moreover, this  
process perspective can help to adapt refugee policies 
to the long-term outlook required to address protracted 
displacement adequately. Looking at PDDs holistically 
shows where humanitarian and development issues 
are interconnected. As protracted displacement also  
 
4 \  Camps come under a lot of criticism, which sometimes overlook the 
constraints that left no other solution feasible (Crisp & Jacobsen, 1998). 
The fact that political constraints have rather increased, and that 
there is little room for alternatives, does nevertheless not change the 
fundamental shortfall of the current policy of the refugee regime to 
live up to its original purpose as lamented by legal experts: “A regime 
which was actually established to guarantee refugees lives in dignity 
until and unless either the cause of their flight is firmly eradicated or 
the refugee himself or herself chooses to pursue some alternative 
solution to their disfranchisement has now become a regime which 
labours nearly single-mindedly to design and implement top-down 
solutions which 'fix the refugee problem.'” (Hathaway, 2007b, p. 3).
In the last years, the numbers of refugees, internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), illegal migrants (urban  
displaced), stateless persons, or “displaced-in-place”1  
populations have been growing (IDMC, 2019; UNHCR, 
2019a) while a decreasing number of displaced persons 
has any perspective to return, resettle or to integrate  
locally. Instead, they remain in a state of protracted 
political, economic and legal crisis that opposes the 
objective of humanitarian and development aid to 
facilitate a humane and dignified life. This state of 
limbo2  exceeds the period of time that short-term  
humanitarian measures are meant to cover and 
thereby becomes a situation in which displaced  
persons are at risk of being trapped in long-term aid 
dependence. This contradicts the intentions of the 
UNHCR’s durable solutions of return, resettlement 
and local integration.3  
1 \  The term ‘displaced in place’ circumscribes groups of forcibly immobi-
lised persons, e.g. due to a war. Lubkemann coined this term in the 
academic debate: “This population …were in effect ‘forcibly immobi-
lized’ by the combined efforts of the government and the insurgency 
to control rural populations, military zones, and international borders. 
This population … can perhaps best be described as having become 
‘displaced in place’, not as a result of their own movement but rather 
because of the war’s immobilizing effects” (Lubkemann, 2008, p. 455). 
This Paper, in contrast to Lubkemann, uses the term to point out that 
this population’s needs and vulnerabilities resemble those of displaced 
persons. If humanitarian or development aid categorises forcibly  
immobilised persons as displaced (in place) it could, thus, resort to the 
same relief strategies.
2 \  ‘Limbo’ is usually defined as, “Uncertain period of awaiting a decision 
or resolution; an intermediate state or condition” (Oxford Dictionary). 
Hyndman and Giles (2016, 2018) argue in a recent study on Somali  
refugees in Dadab that limbo means that the refugees are “living on 
the edge”. Depending on the perspective, analyses highlight this as an 
either exclusive or inclusive condition. The first position follows  
Foucault and highlights the biopolitical function of establishing and 
maintaining a legal, political, and social precarious status of refugeeness 
(see Agamben & Hiepko, 1998). The second position highlights that 
refugees manage to participate in the economic, political and social 
sphere to a certain degree—either despite their status (Turner, 2016) or 
by taking advantage of it (Jansen, 2016). The results of our research on 
protracted displacement indicate that both perspectives contribute to 
a better understanding of PRS, and that it is, furthermore, mandatory—
to get the full picture of PRS—to approach this phenomenon as an 
independent social system rather than to portray protracted refugee 
situations as mere exceptions from everyday life.
3 \  According to the 1951 Geneva Convention, local integration demands 
full economic, social, legal and political integration (Hovil, 2014).
Introduction
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This Working Paper argues that such strategic and 
operational gaps are exemplary for a general phe-
nomenon that concerns most humanitarian and de-
velopment aid agencies that respond to displacement: 
The partial conceptualisation of its target. The research 
question, thus, is whether the process of categorisation 
and designation of beneficiaries—e.g. along the lines 
of vulnerability (Jallow, Heinbecker & Malik, 2004; 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees & 
International Detention Coalition, 2016)—identifies 
the needs of displaced persons effectively or whether, 
on the contrary, it has inherent elements of exclusion 
and reification. 
The term ‘inefficiencies’ needs to be contextualised. 
Humanitarian and development aid that address needs 
caused by displacement are dealing with situations 
whose causes are usually out of reach of their capaci-
ties and mandates. Unless the causes—namely war 
and violent conflict—are addressed on a political level, 
such aid is, by default, trapped in a never-ending  
repeat loop. This does not apply to aid only, as benefi-
ciaries also become trapped in that state of limbo. 
When asking how aid can better meet the needs of 
persons affected by displacement, we need to stress 
that the answer, first of all, needs to be a political one: 
War, violent conflict and human rights violations are 
the root causes of displacement, and all suggestions 
discussed below of how to better adapt aid to needs 
are not only secondary but obsolete if the political  
issue is not addressed. 
impacts on parts of the host societies, it becomes 
necessary to relate, coordinate and interconnect  
development and humanitarian aid seamlessly.5  
Awareness of this necessity has, in fact, been the 
foundation of the current humanitarian–development– 
peace nexus approach laid down, for example, in the 
European Consensus on Development (EU, 2017).6  
Yet, despite all attempts to put a humanitarian–
development–peace-nexus in place, humanitarian 
and development aid are, in practice, still very much 
limited by their mandates and the scale of the crises 
they are facing when dealing with protractedness of 
armed conflict, displacement and the resulting state 
of limbo. Both factors make it necessary to define 
and limit the field of operations concisely, to find an 
operable division of labour and to delegate tasks effi-
ciently. One attempt by practitioners to address this 
necessity was the cluster approach that was estab-
lished in 2005 to coordinate humanitarian missions. 
The cluster approach coordinates the assistance 
delivered in emergency situations by both UN- and 
non-UN humanitarian organisations. The approach 
was envisioned to be “…. part of a wider reform pro-
cess aimed at improving the effectiveness of human-
itarian response by ensuring greater predictability and 
accountability” (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 
2006). Reforms nevertheless did not bear fruit as  
expected. Over a decade later, OCHA (2019) states, 
“there is a need to restate and return to the original 
purposes of clusters refocusing them on strategic and 
operational gaps analysis, planning, assessment and 
results”.7 
5 \  Against the backdrop of the humanitarian-development nexus 
(Krause, 2016; Nyberg–Sørensen, Hear, & Engberg–Pedersen, 2002; OCHA, 
2016) the article deals with both humanitarian aid and development 
aid measures directed at complementing humanitarian measures.
6 \  The commission operationalised the nexus approach as follows: “The 
Council recognises the linkages between sustainable development, 
humanitarian action and conflict prevention and peacebuilding, as well 
as the importance of diplomatic and political solutions to support peace 
and security, in line with the EU Global Strategy and the 2030 Agenda 
on Sustainable Development” (General Secretariat of the Council, 2017)
7 \  The IASC specified that the aim of the cluster approach was “...to 
strengthen system-wide preparedness and technical capacity to respond 
to humanitarian emergencies, and provide clear leadership and account-
ability in the main areas of humanitarian response” (OCHA, 2019).
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The Paper is divided into an empirical and a theo-
retical part. The first two empirical chapters examine 
the relation between aid and need in northern Iraq, 
while the third sets these observations in relation to 
the process of categorisation on a theoretical level.8 
The first chapter is a socio-political analysis of the 
context in northern Iraq. It assesses the historical and 
political context of displacement in Iraq, differentiates 
the situation of refugees and IDPs, and finally exam-
ines the eligibility and categorisation of affected  
individuals. The second chapter investigates the 
needs of displaced persons in the Kurdistan Region 
of Iraq (KRI). It first addresses the need for security 
and perspective, then the need for jobs and income, 
before examining various other needs related to local 
integration such as access to rights, education, food 
or social inclusion. These needs are then contrasted 
in the third theoretical chapter with international 
legal categories used by aid agencies to address situa-
tions of displacement. It identifies shortfalls of ex-post 
categorisation, explores disparities between needs 
and norms, and finally sketches out an indicator- 
based-approach that allows measuring the level of 
impact, hence vulnerability, of displaced persons as 
the primary determinants of needs—regardless of 
their status. The conclusion examines the advantages 
of such a revised approach over continuing with 
‘business as usual’.
8 \  At least in regard to Syria, this is a protracted refugee situation (PRS) 
context. According to UNHCR’s widely used definition (2015, p. 11), PRS 
are cases “in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality 
have been in exile for five years or more in a given asylum country”. 
The case illustrates why the arbitrary distinction of PRS is not always 
useful on the ground. As the war in Syria is on-going, all Syrian refu-
gees are by definition in PRS now. Yet when this research started, this 
was not the case.
CONCEPTUALISING CRISIS, REFUGEES AND IDPs\ M. RUDOLF
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Empirical case studies are crucial for understand-
ing how displaced persons navigate labelling options; 
respectively how those frameworks limited their  
trajectories. The Paper is based on extensive anthro-
pological fieldwork, carried out in northern Iraq from 
2015 to 2018. The study is part of the BICC project 
“Protected rather than protracted: Strengthening  
refugees and peace” funded by the German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ). 
Taking a qualitative mixed-methods approach, 
the author and four local assistants conducted narra-
tive interviews, combined with on-the-spot observa-
tions, focus group discussions and workshops with 
relevant stakeholders. This research addressed  
displaced persons, members of the receiving commu-
nities, experts, international humanitarian and  
development actors, local civil society organisations 
and political authorities. Expert interviews were  
conducted with practitioners from different levels 
working in intergovernmental organisations like  
UNHCR, UNDP, World Bank, IOM, governmental 
institutions, international and national NGOs 
and community-based organisations. Consultants, 
academics and policymakers working on the issue 
complemented these expert interviews by offering 
insights into processes that took place behind closed 
doors. 
Diversity—gender, age, national and ethnic iden-
tities and locally important markers—was an impor-
tant criterion for the samples of displaced persons 
and members of receiving communities. Locations 
and target groups were identified in a continuous  
dialogue with local experts. Following their suggestions, 
we accessed the field from different points of entry. 
Individual respondents were picked randomly from 
each of the identified segments of the identified  
target groups. The number of respondents was then 
enlarged by snowball or random sampling to fulfil 
the mentioned diversity quotas in each location.  
Most interviews and observations were conducted in 
refugee and IDP camps, villages, settlements and 
urban areas with displaced persons and hosts (see 
Map for specific sites). We conducted most of our  
research between January to February and March to 
May 2016. The longitudinal follow-up research ended 
in May 2018. 
The in-depth and longitudinal research is based 
on social-anthropological methods. The team—com-
posed of an urban refugee, a camp refugee, a host 
working in the NGO sector, a non-camp IDP and a 
senior researcher—spent extended time in the field 
and repeatedly visited the respective respondents in 
their environment. The personal background of the 
assistants was diverse regarding gender, education, 
nationality and age. They were trained in the field, 
constantly supervised, and their feedback was con-
tinuously used to refine the research approach. We 
also included a systematic serendipity routine9  to 
collect and process information outside of the box. 
The participative and dialogical research approach 
generated findings that allowed us to select repre-
sentative ideal typical cases without having/ needing 
to claim statistical representativeness. This approach 
allowed us to take into consideration both the life 
stories of affected persons—such as displaced persons 
or hosts—and statements of decision-makers on the 
international and national level. 
9 \  To systematically include serendipity into our research methods 
meant to allow for coincidences not only to happen but to routinely 
follow the opportunities opened by them. In contrast to random sample 
methods, this means that we talked to the neighbours who were  
present next to the house selected by random choice (flip-the-pen 
method, random number method) instead of the targeted house as  
the method would strictly demand. In a concrete case in the Zakho,  
for instance, the neighbour was a host, which helped us to learn about 
the rent arrangements and social relations between IDPs and hosts 
respectively. Systematic serendipity as a method thereby enabled the 
team to learn why somebody was not present and about the relation 
between host and newcomers. When a shepherd passed by, we asked 
him about livestock activities; when we encountered people washing 
their clothes we asked about sanitation, sewage, or we enquired about 
the property right of the land to dry clothes or the gender / age division 
of such work. In sum, serendipity was not evaded as usual but system-
atically sought after.
Methodology
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Box 1
Research sites in Iraq
SYRIA
TURKEY
IRAN
IRAQ
Kabarto I
Kabarto II
Khanke
Shariya
Domiz
Bersive I
Bersive II
Rwanga
Chamishku
Bajet Kandala
SYRIA
SAUDI 
ARABIA
IRAN
IRAQ
DAHUK
DIYALA
SALAH AD DIN
SULAYMANIYAH
KIRKUK
NINAWA
ERBIL
Dahuk
Erbil
Sulaymaniyah
Zakho
Darkar
Rabia
Zummar
Makhmur
Halabja
Dahuk
Zakho
Zummar
Darkar
Source: The Humanitarian Data Exchange 2016.  Map layout: Marianne Wargenau, Fabian Schmidt, Hannes Blitza, September 2017 
Iraq - Research sites
province capital
city
IDP camp
refugee camp
KRI - Kurdistan Region of Iraq
Qushtapa
Harsham
Darashakran
Basirma
Arbat
Arbat
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Identifying strategic and operational gaps theoret-
ically is one thing, but practice might be another. The 
question, thus, is: In how far do these gaps play a role 
on a practical level? Are current categories sufficient to 
holistically identify, measure and address the needs 
and vulnerabilities of displaced persons regarding a 
dignified life, or not? This first chapter tries to answer 
this question by examining the specific differences 
and commonalities of refugees, migrants, and IDPs in 
northern Iraq. The case is well-suited for such a com-
parison as all these persons came to this area for simi-
lar reasons and encountered similar circumstances 
(Dodge, Kaya, Luchtenberg, Mathieu-Comtois, Saleh, 
van den Toorn … & Watkins, 2018; Hagan, Kaiser,  
Hanson, & Parker, 2015). The first subchapter explains 
the historical and socio-cultural context of displace-
ment in the region. The second subchapter lists the 
categories of persons affected by protracted displace-
ment dynamics in northern Iraq. The third subchapter 
examines in how far the categories used by interna-
tional actors match local concepts and where they 
diverge.
Historical background
The situation in Iraq and Syria has had major 
repercussion on the Middle East where the political 
situation had already been highly volatile. The scale 
of displacement caused by the war in Iraq and Syria 
is extraordinary—even in global comparison. Since 
2014 Syria has overtaken Afghanistan as the country 
with the highest number of refugees worldwide and 
repeatedly held the global top position concerning 
IDPs (UNHCR, 2016a, p. 30). In the same year Turkey, 
too has taken the lead from Pakistan and has become 
the country hosting most refugees—most of whom 
came from Iraq and Syria. Lebanon features the highest 
number of refugees per capita (UNHCR, 2018a). Jordan 
has the “second highest share of refugees compared 
to its population in the world, 89 refugees per 1,000 
inhabitants” (UNHCR, 2018a). Iraq was a battleground; 
a country refugees fled from and a host country for 
around 250,000 refugees in 2014. In comparison to 
Syria (2011), the war started later (2014) and ended 
earlier (2017). 
According to our understanding and our reading 
of the literature, the following historical and socio- 
political factors have been crucial in shaping the 
course of armed conflict and displacement in Iraq:10  
   \ Politics playing the tune of ethnoreligious  
division have prevailed in Iraq and led to dis-
placement for centuries (Buchta, 2015; Chatty, 
2010; Dulz & Eva, 2004); 
   \ Colonial administrative order and boundary- 
drawing exercises exacerbated rising national-
istic dissection discourses in the region (Chatty, 
2010; Gunter, 2011; Izady, 2015; Merten, 2014);
   \ The frontlines amongst the current factions 
reflect chasms that have been growing due to 
national political practices of divide-and-rule 
or discrimination since the times of post-colo-
nial nation-building (Hagan et al., 2015; Lister, 
2016);
   \ Recent explosion of ethnoreligious tensions 
cannot be separated from Gulf Wars, the US-led 
invasion and the course of the political project 
to rebuild Iraq (Abdulrazaq & Stansfield, 2016; 
Buchta, 2015; Dodge et al., 2018); 
   \ The current regional geopolitical contest for a 
new order in the Middle East, reflected in the 
rise of proxy warfare in Syria and Iraq, plays 
into all these issues (Buchta, 2015; Cockburn, 
2015; Paasche & Gunter, 2016; Stern & Berger, 
2015).
The context of recent displacement within and 
into Iraq, also has to take the local causes of the war 
against the Islamic State (IS)11  (Cockburn, 2015; Dodge 
et al., 2018), its course (Abdulrazaq & Stansfield, 2016) 
and future scenarios (Cafarella & Wallace, 2019; 
Schlüsing & Mielke, 2018) into account. Such a  
 
10 \  For an in-depth analysis of the history of Iraq and the wider political 
context of the post-colonial period in the Middle East, the literature 
offers various studies and a varied range of possible interpretations. 
History in Iraq is nothing abstract: It was not unusual, for example to 
hear respondents relating recent attacks by IS with pogroms against 
Christians, Yezidis, Shia or Sunnis that had happened centuries ago, in 
an everyday discussion.
11 \  Islamic State; in Arabic Daesh, the acronym for ISIS or ISIL, which 
translates into Islamic State of Iraq and Sham respectively Iraq and 
Levante.
Socio-political analysis of protracted displacement 
dynamics in northern Iraq
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mostly legal conventions.14  Due to its relative stability 
and security, KRI became the destination of choice 
for most displaced persons from the neighbouring  
areas most of whom integrated informally rather 
than going to camps.15  
“Kurdistan for us has always been a showcase of 
democracy and development, so we wanted to come 
here”, an Arab from Anbar explained his choice and 
the preference of IDPs to come to a camp close to  
Sulaymaniya (Arbat camp, April 2016). KRI has been 
the region with the highest number of IDPs (cf. Table 1 
below) and refugees.16  However, the majority of dis-
placed persons has not settled into camps: Over 70 
per cent live outside them.17  Most of the camps—as 
well as humanitarian and development actors—are 
found in the Dohuk region that borders Syria and the 
Iraqi province Ninewa. The refugee population is  
virtually completely made up of Syrian Kurds as they 
mostly share language, tradition and religion with 
the local host community. IDPs in this area, on the 
other hand, are made up of Sunni Arabs, Yezidis, 
Christians of different denominations and a few other, 
small ethnoreligious minorities such as Turkmens or 
Shabak, many of whom have been displaced multiple 
times already. In sum, the government’s reactions  
observable in KRI at the moment of the crisis illustrate 
the crucial role international categories and routines 
for aid play: Camps were established, refugees and 
IDPs received different assistance. Yet, at the same 
time, the majority of displaced persons bypassed 
these structures and aid altogether as they preferred 
to settle in KRI informally.
14 \  Even though the Kurdish government officially chose to follow inter-
national conventions on refugees, the practice differed considerably: 
Rather than following a nation-state logic in which citizens are  
foremost defined by their nationality, the KRG differentiated displaced  
persons along ethnic lines—namely Kurds and Arabs (Kurdish- 
speaking versus Arabic-speaking).
15 \  The Shia population mostly migrated to southern Iraq.
16 \  According to latest UNHCR figures (2019b), the combined percentage  
of Syrian refugees in Iraq outside KRI hardly reaches one per cent— 
in other words, roughly 99 per cent of currently around 228,500 Syrian 
refugees in Iraq stay in KRI.
17 \  “Almost 2 million people remain displaced, of which over half have 
been displaced for more than three years. A significant majority of  
displaced people (71 per cent) reside outside of camps, mostly within 
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Ninewa governorate” (CCCM Cluster 
Iraq, 2018).
context analysis reveals that displacement in Iraq 
should have been anything but a surprise. Yet, against 
the backdrop of a seemingly regional bushfire follow-
ing the Arab Spring after 2010, the international com-
munity considered the situation of Iraq to be relatively 
stable. With the attacks by IS members in Europe in 
late 2015, this changed significantly: The threat that 
IS supposedly posed to European security came into 
the centre of attention of whom, unfortunately at the 
expense of interest for the drivers of violence inside 
Iraq. The local causes inside Iraq remained mostly in 
the background of debates (Dodge et al., 2018). In the 
wake of the attacks in Europe, both IS and the coali-
tion against Daesh/IS stressed in unison the global 
scale of the conflict.12  
The shifting focus to global developments has 
probably been the reason for the relative indifference 
of political actors and aid organisations towards any 
diachronic and socio-political analyses of the local 
context in Iraq. Besides, once a humanitarian emer-
gency was a given in Iraq, there was no more time for 
disaggregating events in Syria and Iraq.13  As in any 
other moments of crisis, reliable routines of humani-
tarian and development aid agencies were set in  
motion: Here, the common routine facing mass  
displacement was to deliver aid in already existing or 
newly set up camps, and accordingly, the Kurdish 
government opened a dozen camps. Aid measures  
follow tested project designs (Zetter, 2018, p. 20ff.); the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) defined the eligibility 
of beneficiaries in KRI according to international, 
 
 
 
12 \  Adversaries as well as supporters portrayed IS more and more as a 
movement of international combatants fighting for a universal cause. 
The PR battle deserves a detailed analysis that cannot be delivered 
here. To follow the main lines, consult the journal Dabiq (available in 
English and collected on the site https://clarionproject.org/islam-
ic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq-50/#). On a more  
analytical level, see publications by the Institute for the Study of War 
(ISW), available at http://www.understandingwar.org/publications).
13 \  Actionism alone does not always suffice. Violent conflict has been 
demanding swift reactions by humanitarian agencies. It is in the  
nature of such swift reactions that they hardly ever allow enough time 
for in-depth conflict analyses. Yet, when the most basic needs are met 
and dust has settled, such analyses are a prerequisite to elaborating 
sustainable mid- and long-term perspectives (Rudolf, 2014).
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Refugees and IDPs in KRI
In which regard did displaced persons differ from 
the official categorisation of refugees and IDPs? At 
the time of research in northern Iraq, the crucial  
difference lay in the type of residence: A considerable 
amount of IDPs and Syrian refugees stayed inside 
camps, but a vast majority lived outside camps (>70% 
see above). The latter were either renting housing or 
squatting in urban and rural areas. Another impor-
tant difference was ethnicity: The Syrian refugees 
who fled to Iraq were mostly Syrian Kurds. This has 
three reasons: First, the fact that the heart region of 
IS was stretching over the Syrian–Iraqi border from 
Raqqa to Mosul. This practically meant that Syrians 
had to cross much more distance (than to the official 
Syrian–Iraqi border) to become an international  
refugee. Second, that KRI became the only viable 
point of exit for Syrian Kurds who felt squeezed in  
between two hostile powers, with IS on the one side 
and Turkey on the other. Third, political, social and 
economic ties between northern Syria and northern 
Iraq are strong: A common language, shared social 
structures and cultural practices, shared political  
ambitions—and family or trade networks that stretch 
over the border. Fourth, a prevailing strong narrative 
about a culturally homogeneous and historically  
unified Kurdistan.18  Due to those commonalities and 
a vivid memory of having been victims of displacement 
themselves, many people in KRI initially welcomed 
the Kurdish Syrian refugees showing solidarity with 
their situation.  
After wars like the intra-Kurdish (1994–1997) and 
the Second Gulf War (2003) had ended, hopes were 
high that Erbil would become a new Dubai—an eco-
nomic hub and a haven of political stability. With the 
erosion of the central state of Iraq and the rising 
strength of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), 
such ideas seemed to come true. KRI established de 
facto control over Kirkuk and its ever important oil 
revenues. It sidelined Baghdad by trading oil and 
18 \  This narrative is for example visible in popular culture such as in 
song lyrics and music clips (cf. Aras Koyi: Kurdistana Min, 2013 as a 
typical example of countless similar songs) or shared folklore; the 
image of a mother whose four sons—Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria—are  
separated by international borders.
other revenues directly with Turkey. KRI was expand-
ing, and people from Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan and 
also Syria provided the manpower needed on con-
struction sites, hotels, restaurants and in many other 
branches to sustain this growth. Due to the men-
tioned affinities, well-qualified (Kurdish) refugees 
from Syria were initially most welcome and easily  
integrated. In the summer of 2012, there were less 
than 10,000 Syrian refugees in Iraq; the following 
year, this number had increased ten times (UNHCR, 
2016b).19  
The high number of Syrian refugees in Iraq is 
topped by that of internally displaced persons. The 
recent conflict in Iraq fostered existing ethnoreligious 
divisions. The major ethnoreligious communities 
came together in the different corners of Iraq: Kurds 
in the north, Sunni (locally called Arabs) in the west, 
and Shia in the south. During the ethnosectarian  
war in Iraq from 2004 to 2006, most members of the 
Christian and Yezidi minorities fled to KRI and the 
Nineveh region, historic home to diverse religious 
communities, to escape harassment and intimidation 
in Bagdad. After IS took control of the Nineveh Plains 
and the Shingal area, home to the Yezidis, KRI became 
the last resort for religious minorities. A priest sum-
marised this feeling of relative safety: “This [Ainkawa 
district of Erbil] will be the last place in Iraq that 
Christians will leave” (Ainkawa, January 2016). 
Minorities such as Kurds, Christians and Yezidis 
reported to have lost access to legal aid, political 
rights, legal documents, the right to own property 
and human rights. Though they had been affected to 
various degrees; They had been facing massacres,  
detainment, torture, abduction, intimidation, extortion, 
deportation and expropriation, no right to own prop-
erty, no identification papers, in sum, being deprived 
of all citizens’ rights. Virtually all displaced persons 
 
19 \  In April 2016, at the height of the war against IS, 246.589 Syrian  
refugees were registered with UNHCR in 87,581 households, of which 
39 per cent lived in camps and 61 per cent in urban, peri-urban or rural 
areas (UNHCR, 2016b). The vast majority lived in northern Iraq, where 
58 per cent lived in the major Kurdish urban centres of Dohuk, Erbil, 
and Sulaymaniyah. The camp residents were dispersed over ten sites. 
Camp numbers showed an even distribution of men (51%) and women 
(49%). The 30,000 persons who were moving on to or back to Syria 
equalled the amount of new arrivals who continued to come to Iraq 
(UNHCR, 2016b).
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(UNHCR, 2017) as large parts of the population  
remained trapped inside Mosul during the battle 
(Nebehay & Markey, 2017). Many of the persons who 
fled the battle of Mosul headed to KRI (Reach, 2018). 
After IS had been driven out of all its Iraqi strong-
holds and had to retreat to Syria or go underground, 
the number of Iraqi returnees (2,844,618) exceeded 
the number of IDPs (2,780,406) for the first time  
according to updated statistics on 15 December 2017. 
According to the most recent IOM Data (2019), the 
current number of returnees of 4,305,138 more than 
doubles the number of IDPs of 1,607,148.
and most hosts unanimously reported that such 
incidents had occurred in their families. Yet most  
respondents were clinging to the notion of the 
“sweetness of their homes against all odds”.20 The level 
of resilience in the face of insecurity and violence 
shown by respondents in general was remarkably 
high as illustrated by Case 1 (see below). 
The number of IDPs increased from 500,000 in 
April 2014 to over three million shortly before the  
battle of Mosul in August 2016 (IOM, 2019). At that 
time, senior UN staff expected up to an additional 
three million IPDs due to the campaigns to liberate 
IS-held territory including Iraq’s second-biggest city 
of Mosul.21  In fact, this number was only met halfway 
20 \  Both hosts and displaced persons agreed that having lost their home 
distinguishes refugees and IDPs from host communities. “My home is 
sweeter than yours”, was the proverb used repeatedly in interviews to 
underline that nobody left voluntarily and that everybody wants to 
return eventually (KRI, January-May, 2016).
21 \  Interview with Deputy Special Representative for Iraq Lisa Grande, 
May 2016.
Source: IOM Iraq, 2019, p.5; Note: It should be taken into account that Kirkuk was a de facto part of KRI up to 2018
Table 1  
Movements per governorate of origin and governorate of displacement
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shops or areas of origin that they could not return to 
for the time being—yet, they refused to be labelled 
IDPs or refugees. According to our research, the expe-
riences and needs of supported and unsupported  
people mostly overlap, but they differ in their self- 
assessments of being able to cope with displacement 
and their claims to be in need. 
The question of self-assessment is crucial through- 
out the trajectories of displaced persons as Aziz’s case 
show. His story showcases a usually remarkably high 
degree of resilience in a context of war:22  The individual 
threshold for the decision to flee or migrate is not 
only related to concrete insecurity, political persecu-
tion, fear of life, economic reasons, desperation, hunger, 
or other single reasons but usually to a combination 
of factors. Insecurity, violence, and destruction are 
tolerated (in the sense of enduring not accepting), 
and displacement only occurs when there are no other 
alternatives. Just as the decision to flee is related to a 
combination of factors, so is the decision to request 
aid. Despite experiencing the recounted hardships, 
despite the burden of having to leave his family in an 
area affected by armed conflict, and despite his own 
traumatic experiences, Aziz did not request aid, but 
coped by re-establishing a livelihood abroad. 
During field research, it became evident that the 
current humanitarian agencies’ practice of providing 
assistance encouraged displaced persons to adapt 
their stories to categories rather than to contribute 
with their stories to tailor-made needs assessments 
and programmes. Strategical compliance is rational 
from the perspective of beneficiaries: If a person fails 
to meet the conditions set up to receive aid, access to 
aid will be denied. We, for example, encountered a 
migrant worker who had to apply for refugee status 
to be able to join his family in a refugee camp (see 
Case 1 below). If he had stressed his success as migrant 
worker in the application process for a place in the 
22 \  The term resilience has been criticised for the implicit political  
message that displaced persons can fend for themselves stressing the 
individual responsibility of actors (Chandler, 2014; Joseph & Juncos, 
2019; Wagner & Anholt, 2016). In this Paper, resilience is used to describe 
the ability of individuals to come back and cope against all odds— 
acknowledging that this remarkable agency does not deny structural 
constraints or exempt other parties from their responsibilities.
In general, the situation of IDPs and refugees in 
KRI is more complex than reflected in most statistics. 
The reasons to flee to KRI and the situations that dis-
placed persons encountered upon arrival are diverse. 
After decades of re-emerging tensions, and civil wars, 
there are various generations of internally displaced 
persons and former refugees, who now often facilitate 
the integration of newcomers. Syrians finally are 
staying in and outside of camps or have successfully 
integrated locally. The diversity within both groups is 
considerable and makes any generalisation of needs 
difficult.
Eligibility and categorisation of  
displaced persons
The numbers of IDPs in KRI are probably even 
higher than officially stated, as many who had fled 
from the ethnoreligious war to KRI before 2014 (most 
between 2004 and 2006) did not register as IDPs and 
are not included in the figures mentioned earlier.  
Numerous rich Arabs who own houses in Kurdish 
mountain resorts or have invested in residential 
housing projects in KRI also did not register as they 
were able to change residence from IS-held territory 
to KRI. The same is true for a number of other Iraqi 
workers and entrepreneurs from non-KRI provinces 
who had already worked in KRI when IS occupied 
their homes. Finally, many Syrians did not register  
either. Despite being eligible theoretically, they did 
not feel that they were in need of aid as the following 
quote exemplifies: 
I did not register as a refugee because I am married 
to an Iraqi. We are well off, thank God. The help 
should be given to the ones in need. Would I like to 
go back to Damascus? Yes, a thousand times, if I 
could (Syrian woman working for an NGO, Dohuk, 
May 2016). 
This answer shows that beyond legal definitions, 
‘refugee’ or ‘IDP’ as colloquial terms are often related 
to vulnerability and precarious living conditions. 
Like this woman, a number of other respondents stated 
that they had been forced to abandon their homes, 
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These two examples show, first, how categories 
cannot sufficiently accommodate the dynamics of 
displacement and the needs arising out of it, second 
how they exclude persons and third, how persons 
avoid such exclusion by making their story fit the re-
quirements. In practice, most attention is given to 
the third fact: In Iraq as elsewhere, a lot of time and 
resources went into the vetting processes to identify  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
those who are assumedly abusing the system—the 
system of excluding those who are not eligible that is. 
The categories as such were rarely criticised. The fact 
that some persons were excluded despite being eligi-
ble was deplored but seen as exceptions (various in-
terviews with camp staff, 2016). Yet, because some-
where in the process, needs are adapted to categories 
rather than categories being adapted to needs, those 
mistakes are not singular but systematic.23 
23 \  The Paper will, thus, focus on the concepts that frame the categorisa-
tion and administration of displaced persons rather than criticising 
the tools and indicators applied by them.
camp, the camp manager would have asked the mi-
grant worker’s wife and children to leave the camp 
instead of allowing the husband into the camp. The 
rejection/expulsion would have been justified with 
the arguments that space was scarce, demand for a 
place in the camp is high, and the family’s vulnera-
bilities low in comparison to others (camp manager, 
interview February 2016). 
We were given another example of someone who 
did not qualify as a beneficiary in Rwanga Camp: A 
man from a village in the Shingal area had lost his 
family twice. The first time, because all women were 
taken and all men were killed. He and a few others 
had been taken for dead lying in a pile of corpses. The 
second time that he lost his family was because aid 
measures that transferred survivors for treatment  
to Germany had only been aimed at female Yezidis, 
assuming that none of the male villagers survived 
(Rwanga Camp, February 2016). 
Case 1  
War refugee or migrant worker?
Aziz, a man in his forties, stays with his family in the refugee camp Qusthapa, south of Erbil. He lives with his wife and children in one of the 
houses built by the United Arab Emirates. The house consists of a small courtyard that is used as kitchen, a terrace and storage facility, a living 
room and a bedroom. It has water, electricity and a toilet. The camp population is entirely made up of Syrian Kurdish refugees. It is rather crowded 
but offers all amenities typical to such camps: Meeting facilities for women and elders, sports grounds for young people, some shacks turned into 
shops and restaurants, child-friendly spaces, NGO and camp management offices. It is situated less than an hour’s drive from the Kurdish capital. 
Many inhabitants had found work in nearby factories upon arrival, but most lost their jobs again after the onset of the economic crisis of 2014/15. 
Many of the workers complained about low salaries, and especially the women reported harassment at the working space. 
Aziz used to be an electrician who fixed meters in the Kurdish part of Syria. As a Kurd, he had problems to be recognised as a national citizen in 
Syria. He recounts: “I could neither own land nor buy a house or a shop. I had been harassed and threatened repeatedly by the Syrian regime for 
being active in Kurdish cultural activities [such as theatre and dancing groups]”. Even though he had obtained a degree, he explained: “I could not 
get permanent employment and had to live on daily jobs”. As he did not have the necessary documentation, he could neither get proper employment 
nor buy a shop, so he rented a workshop to earn a basic income. “When the economic situation in Syria got unbearable, I went to Iraq to find a job 
there [to come back and pay the workshop’s rent]. He did find a job in Sulaymaniyah. His family stayed behind in the Syrian war. “An explosion 
hit the vicinity of my family’s home in Syria”. As a result, he recounts, “my wife and children fled to Iraq. Finally, they ended up in a refugee camp 
close to Erbil.”
Even though his boss offered to raise his salary [as a migrant worker] significantly, Aziz decided to join his family that lived in a refugee camp at 
the time. To live with them, he became a registered refugee himself. He asserted: “Before my family came, I was not a refugee”. He considered  
himself a migrant worker. Despite all experiences of human rights violations, threats and war discrimination, despite leaving his family behind 
in a war zone, he does not consider these issues to be the cause of his migration. He insisted that he had moved for economic reasons: “I could no 
longer feed my children”. In 2018, he managed to get a position in a Kurdish TV station, and one of his daughters won a scholarship by an interna-
tional organisation. 
Aziz, 45, married, three children, construction worker, northern Syria
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In summary, we encountered various cases dur-
ing our research, where categories and needs did not 
necessarily match each other: We met Yezidis from 
the Sinjar area who had lost all their property, re-
sources, large parts of their family and had escaped, 
suffering from serious physical and psychological 
shocks who lived in informal settlements and Sunni 
Arabs from Mosul who had apartments in a Kurdish 
mountain resort, were able to anticipate troubles and 
saved all assets and family members by moving to 
their summer residence permanently. In some cases, 
IDPs from IS-held territories who owned houses in 
KRI rented those houses out to other IDPs. Summing 
up, displacement had contradicting impacts on those 
categorised as IDPs. While some had lost everything, 
others improved their general economic situation in 
the process of dispossession and displacement.
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Our research has shown that the current practice 
of assessing needs for aid systematically overlooks 
the relevance of certain issues for displaced persons 
regardless of categories: Economic, social, political 
impacts of displacement vary within the respective 
groups/categories in accordance with the duration  
of exile and individual factors. These needs are not 
directly related to the life-threatening issues such  
as access or perspectives regarding access to land, 
employment (livelihood), housing, social inclusion, 
nutrition, health, community assets, social networks 
or education. Taking these needs as a basis and com-
paring the impact(s) of displacement (incl. life and 
restrictions in camps, access to aid, impact on the  
labour market) across the mentioned groups/categories 
rather than focusing on one group alone, has shown 
that the needs are interrelated and defined by the 
wider context. The following first subchapter will, 
thus, work out the needs of security and perspective 
that displaced persons have in common across the 
categories they are put into ex-post. The second 
subchapter will then address the needs of jobs and 
income and illustrate how changes in the wider  
context of politics and economy have affected the  
situation of the displaced. The third subchapter finally 
examines the influence of these economic changes 
on access to nutrition, education, or documentation; 
and it shows how these changes had a detrimental 
impact on the need for social inclusion as the relation 
between the receiving community and displaced  
persons altered.
The need of security and perspectives
The differentiation between migrants and  
refugees is usually based on their assumedly different 
reasons to move: economic in the first case, security 
in the latter case. A refugee camp manager noted that 
IDPs and refugees,24  inside and outside of camps, 
documented or undocumented were all hoping for a  
 
24 \  Displacement caused by IS illustrated the point of overlaps between 
the categories of refugees and IDPs neatly as the border between Syria 
and Iraq ceased to exist during its reign.
Assessing needs of displaced persons across 
categories
better life abroad. He nevertheless distinguished mi-
grants and refugees in regard to their status: “Syrians 
come as economic migrants” he explained. Qualifying 
this statement he continued: “This means they do 
not come because of war, but because of the conse-
quences of war, which are no school, no water, no  
perspectives” (Camp Manager KRI, May 2017). In other 
words, the distinction between those who flee due  
to war and those who flee for economic reasons is 
ambiguous. According to our sample of randomly  
selected cases, economic problems were the straw 
that broke the camel’s back for most Syrians. They 
had mostly been displaced at least twice. The first  
displacement had occurred within Syria, and the  
second displacement to Iraq. 
While respondents explained that they could  
endure hardships such as violence and insecurity, 
they stressed that they had to flee once they could no 
longer provide for their families. “I could not find 
food for my children anymore,” was the most com-
monly heard statement about the reasons to leave 
(various interviews, KRI, January-February 2016).  
Syrian parents virtually unanimously added that the 
search for better education was a connected motive 
for displacement. The Syrians saw no future for the 
children in both perspectives. In consequence, they 
were most worried about education in exile, too.  
Uncertainties about the future were also a principal 
reason to flee amongst young men. Many Syrian refu-
gees left Syria to avoid young male family members 
being drafted. For the young men themselves, it was 
probably the single most important reason. To avoid 
being drafted by the Syrian forces or the Kurdish  
People’s Defense Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel–YPG) 
respectively the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), they 
had been among the first ones who went abroad. For 
this same reason, they were also the least likely to 
consider return. Political motives, discrimination,  
intimidation, and insecurity, however, were men-
tioned relatively seldom.25  
25 \  In contrast to assumptions held previously by the researchers that 
this is mostly related to a high level of trauma and a specific culture of 
silence on issues such as rape—we learnt during the research process 
that this was only partially the case. Rape and abuse were often dis-
cussed rather openly—especially in private settings.
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IDPs, in contrast to refugees, mostly reported of 
direct attacks as the main cause of their displacement. 
Most had been experiencing armed conflict, insur-
gencies and shifting monopolies of violence before26—
and had, therefore, developed a high-risk tolerance or 
efficient strategies for living close to armed actors. 
They only left after the threats or violence or collateral 
damage affected them directly. The other tipping 
point for deciding to leave home was the lack of per-
spectives and trust (cf. Case 2). All Iraqi ethnoreligious 
groups in displacement—Yezidis, Christians, Shia and 
Sunni alike—were sceptical about the possibility of 
future coexistence (Costantini & Palani, 2017) and 
had already fled (IDPs) or were often considering it. 
According to the members of the minorities, 
the discrimination by the respective ethnoreligious 
majority had reached a point of no return: “The first 
question I ask people nowadays before I let them in 
[my house] is about their religion. Before, I never did 
this, and I would have never done it—everybody was 
an Iraqi for me—it was simple as that”, a well-educated 
and well-off Yezidi father of a family who had not 
been displaced and was living near Dohuk told us 
(Shariya, February 2016). Another man, a Yezidi from 
Shingal, explained why he did not believe that it 
would be possible to reconcile ever again as follows: 
“They took our girls and killed our men, how can I 
trust my neighbours again?”, he asked (Khanke,  
February 2016). The following case also exemplifies 
how a lack of trust and perspective influence the  
trajectories of displaced persons. It also shows, in 
sum, that the issue of securing people’s livelihood is 
not confined to short-term perspectives only. Even in 
emergency situations, long-term projections count. 
In line with the case of Aziz and others, questions 
about available alternatives and prospects in the 
future are playing a crucial role regarding the needs 
and strategic decisions of displaced persons. These 
needs, in turn, are related to past experiences—and, 
in Iraq, to social memories of considerable historic 
depth, which need to be taken into account, too.
26 \  Shifting monopolies refers to the change of authority in a given terri-
tory, such as zones of civil wars as in eastern Congo (Larmer, Laudati, 
& Clark, 2013; Prunier, 2004; Verweijen, 2013).
Case 2  
Persecuted minorities in Iraq
Dilsoz originally comes from an area, the Nineveh Plains, where different 
religious communities had lived side by side for centuries—although 
not always peacefully. She explains that she had already been displaced 
once before, as a student in Mosul: "[In 2007] 24 Yezidis were killed in 
Mosul. After that, no Christians and Yezidis were allowed to study 
there anymore. I had to leave and studied in Zakho [in KRI] to become 
an English teacher. 
When IS conquered Mosul, all religious minorities were expelled,  
enslaved or killed, and Dilsoz had to flee with her family once again. 
They fled from Bashiqua, Nineveh Province, Iraq to KRI in 2016. She 
explains: “With the Kurdish degree [from Zakho] it was easy to find a 
job in Dohuk [Kurdish region] when we fled from Daesh". The family 
was nevertheless far from living in peace: "My husband was a Peshmerga 
and was wounded. His position was often bombed. After that happened 
[while he was there] I told him, either you stop or you go to Germany. 
We have already lost everything, our house, everything. I don't want to 
lose you, too". 
Dilsoz continues to explain that her sister-in-law, a brother and an 
uncle had all already arrived in Europe. "We're all going to Germany. 
Everyone will go. There is no future for Yezidis here, after everything 
that has happened to us. My husband is already there [in Germany]. 
He's fine, but he misses his family", the teacher explains. "Coming to 
Germany costs about 4,000 US dollars. The smugglers know how to 
make money. There were four buses full of Yezidis [at her first, failed 
attempt to reach her husband]", reports Dilsoz. She recounts how her 
brother made it all the way to Turkey. After fifteen days there, he made 
it to Greece. "There he was arrested and sent back [to Iraq] after two 
days. At least he did not have had to pay the 4,000 US dollars". 
When Dilsoz tried to go to Turkey with her two children of six and 
eight in January 2017, she already had the necessary visa. Yet just as 
she was sitting on the bus waiting to leave, the border was closed. In 
March, at her second attempt, her salary did not arrive—throughout 
the KRI territory public employees had to wait for months for their 
wages. In consequence, she had to postpone the trip again. The situation 
of her family complicates things even more as Dilsoz points out: “My 
mother wants to stay here [in Iraq], but I just want to be reunited with 
my husband". Her husband had a residence permit for five months at 
the time, which made long-term plans difficult. To join him quickly was 
no option, as Dilsoz was still missing all papers that were necessary to 
go to Germany. She explained that she would have to go to Baghdad to 
get the marriage certificate. But because the road to Baghdad still led 
through IS-held territory at the time, she commented, "that requires a 
lot of money and time".
Dilsoz, 32 years, married, two children, English teacher from  
Bashiqua, Nineveh Province, Iraq
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The need of livelihoods and income
Moving away from the causes and direct impacts 
to (de facto) local integration in the aftermath of  
displacement, a similar picture is revealed: Needs 
vary within the classical categories (refugees, IDPs, 
hosts, migrants) on the one hand and are cutting 
across them on the other. The only difference between 
the Syrians who arrived in the KRI during the eco-
nomic boom period (from 2006 to 2014) as migrants 
and those who arrived afterwards as refugees was 
that the latter brought in additional (international) 
aid resources. In consequence, many well-qualified 
individuals from Syria found jobs in the humanitarian 
sector quickly—a fact that gave them a considerable 
leeway later when such jobs became highly desirable. 
Securing their livelihood was unsurprisingly the 
number one problem mentioned by all affected 
groups when asked about the challenges they faced 
during displacement. During the economic boom  
before 2014, many Syrians found jobs in Turkish  
enterprises that exploited them. Some were paid  
extremely low salaries, others no salaries at all. Many 
Syrians but also Christian Iraqis recounted cases 
where their employers left the country without pay-
ing them. A Christian girl from the Nineveh Plains 
said: “My brother was so upset after he did not get 
any payment, after working for three months, that he 
went to Germany” (Erbil, May 2016). The family had 
lived in an apartment with three other Christian 
families in Erbil. They were 20 persons in four rooms 
and shared the rent among family members. After-
wards, the parents and daughters managed to move 
to a better and more spacious place while the sons 
moved on to Lebanon and Germany. Displaced  
persons attributed the reasons for their precarious 
position to missing networks and the volatile  
political situation. 
With the continuous arrival of large numbers of 
mostly unqualified IDPs (displaced by IS) who were 
searching for jobs, the situation changed. A high- 
ranking civil servant in the town hall of Dohuk  
explained: “The Syrians are well qualified. They are 
no problem. The IDPs, on the contrary, are not quali-
fied. For them it is much harder to find work” (Dohuk, 
February 2016). When the economic situation became 
increasingly unstable in 2016, the job market 
changed significantly. The host community largely 
remained in stable jobs, though often with long  
periods of not receiving any salary, while many Syrians 
lost their jobs. After salaries of most Kurdish Iraqis 
continued to be withheld, the host community joined 
the competition for already scarce jobs. A foreign 
journalist noted: “Before, everybody wanted to work 
in the oil industry. Now everybody wants to work in 
the aid sector” (Erbil, January, 2016).27 
Housing is an issue where the needs of receiving 
communities, most IDPs, and refugees differ: Most 
refugees lived in rented properties. The question of 
paying rents, therefore, became a top concern for  
Syrians and drove people to seek access to the camps. 
“People used to see the camps as a last resort. But now, 
we have waiting lists for the camps and not enough 
space. Some landlords unloaded refugee families in 
front of our camp gates because they could no longer 
pay the rent”, an NGO worker explained (Darashakran, 
January 2016).28  A clear indicator of how much the 
situation had deteriorated in 2016 was given in the 
refugee camp Darashakaran. The camp is fairly well 
built, but situated in the middle of nowhere, north-
east of Erbil: Even though it is quite remote, the camp 
management was approached by members of the 
host community who wanted to move into the camp.  
 
 
27 \  By 2018, even the refugees who had worked with international NGOs 
said that they lacked the connections necessary to get a job: “All jobs 
are given to the Iraqis nowadays—even if they do not speak English” 
(Syrian refugee, Erbil, August 2018).
28 \  Many displaced persons had preferred to stay in unfinished buildings 
in the urban areas to be able to find jobs and go to work without high 
costs for transportation.
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In one of the cases, an Iraqi woman from the host 
population was allowed to move into the camp after 
she had married a Syrian refugee. Given the obliga-
tion of the husband to provide for his wife and the 
fact that he had no job, the request was reasonable 
because housing, water and electricity are free of cost 
inside the camp. 
Looking at the impact of the changing economic 
context, in sum, shows the constraints of support 
programmes. While the economy was thriving,  
displaced persons could cover many needs them-
selves. Once the economy went down, the displaced 
were affected twofold: first because they often lost 
their income and second because the receiving com-
munity was not only assisting less but starting to 
compete with the displaced for livelihoods.   
Conflicting needs
Initially, the solidarity of the host community 
was relatively high. It still is and even during the  
economic crisis in 2016, we observed how private  
persons were bringing donations to displaced 
non-Kurdish Sunni29  in IDP camps. Yet our study  
also showed that the host community became more 
exasperated and hostile due to the economic crisis 
and decreasing work opportunities. Displaced per-
sons were blamed for being partly responsible for the 
decrease in wages—especially for daily workers. The 
impact of state employees not being paid their sala-
ries for nearly half a year in a region where a majority 
of people exist directly or indirectly thanks to these 
salaries has been devastating. The initial solidarity 
declined in consequence and (de facto) local integra-
tion in KRI became much harder for Syrians and IDPs.
Schooling was another point of conflict between 
hosts and displaced persons. Due to the increased 
number of students in class and the rising frequency 
of strikes amongst teachers, the quality of education 
was deteriorating. Tensions between the host and the 
newcomer communities were rising. Virtually all 
parents interviewed were unsatisfied with schooling. 
IPDs and refugees in KRI deplored the lack of a  
curriculum in Arabic or bilingual schools. Access to 
29 \  The solidarity with these so-called Arabs was often lower than with 
Kurdish refugees or Kurdish IDPs.
education is relatively well organised for primary 
schools in KRI (Reach, 2016, p. 7). Yet attendance 
dropped in secondary schools. Girls were even less 
likely to go to secondary school if they attend them 
outside the camp. The key barriers were lack of 
funds for school uniforms and transport. The after-
effects of missed higher education will probably 
pose a long-term challenge. At the time of the  
research, it was a major source of discontent voiced 
by the receiving community.
Increasing bureaucratic hurdles heightened 
vulnerabilities of Syrians and IDPs considerably 
and could, in fact, be seen as a measure of exclu-
sion.30  Most aid—even that provided by the World 
Food Programme—is linked to the public distribution 
system (PDS). Even refugees get such a card. To get 
a PDS card, identity cards, a marriage contract, a 
proof of residence card and other documents are 
needed. For IDPs, those can only be issued in the 
province of origin or Baghdad.31  Missing documents 
meant that civilians were not able to access basic 
services, find legal employment, and were at risk of 
being arrested any time (‘DTM-IOM-Iraq Mission’, 
2019). This is accentuated by the loss of access to  
established networks: IDPs have lost their local  
patron–client and extended family connections 
with which such problems could have been evaded 
or at least would have been required to sort them 
out.32  
30 \  According to a UNHCR report, restrictions on movement for e.g. IDPs 
in and outside camps, and multiple problems associated with a loss 
of civil documentation were growing in 2016 (UNHCR, 2016c, p. 3f.).
31 \  The problems that arose when documents, either lost during  
displacement or not regarded as important—as in the case of many 
Yezidis that we met—were, therefore, considerable.
32 \  According to camp profiling studies, the top three priorities raised 
by IDPs were access to livelihoods, food, and health care. 83 per cent 
said food was their utmost important problem even though 94 to 
100 per cent reportedly had acceptable food consumption scores 
(Reach, 2016). This apparent discrepancy might be explained by the 
fact that the vast majority of over 90 per cent had access to Iraq’s 
public distribution system of food (PDS). These statistics need to be 
contextualised by differentiating the coping strategies to evaluate 
the long-term impact correctly. These strategies cover up current 
problems but will aggravate them probably in the long run: nearly 
half of the IDPs reported to cope by making more debts, a third said 
they were depending on charity, and a quarter of the interviewed 
were spending their savings; the acceptable food score might be 
due to tactics like eating cheaper food which is a potentially prob-
lematic reaction, too.
CONCEPTUALISING CRISIS, REFUGEES AND IDPs\ M. RUDOLF
23 \ \ WORKING PAPER 9  \ 2019
The economic crisis, in sum, had wide-ranging 
effects on the needs of displaced persons and the 
receiving community. Many of which, like a less 
supportive social climate or more red tape, do not 
seem to be directly related to needs at first glance. But 
displaced persons were again victimised twice: Their 
needs could no longer be absorbed by the receiving 
community, and they lost the established social  
networks necessary to compensate for this damage. 
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than displacement as a whole or its impacts as such.34 
Whenever (humanitarian) aid follows those self- 
referential loops instead of preventing them, there is 
the danger that they address status rather than needs 
(Linde, 2011).
One of the reasons why displaced persons are  
categorised ex-post is that the mandate of aid organi-
sations usually only takes effect after the refugee  
situation has arisen. Besides, the place of origin from 
where a person is displaced is often inaccessible.  
Instead of being able to check the occurred damage 
in that place, the situation has to be reconstructed 
ex-post at the time and location where refugees come 
into contact with the mandated organisations. Often, 
events are also reconstructed from scratch as data 
such as civil records, registers or identity documents 
do not exist, have been lost or are not accessible. In 
sum, the characteristics that make a person a refugee, 
IDP, person of concern, or stateless person are not 
systematic or remain invisible (Polzer & Hammond, 
2008). 
Our research question was whether the categori-
sation of displaced persons was efficient in grasping 
the realities and needs of displaced persons, or 
whether elements of exclusion and reification lead to 
inefficiencies of aid. Looking into the Iraqi case, we 
saw that on the one hand exclusion refers to the fact 
that certain individuals and groups are eligible for 
humanitarian or development assistance while others 
are disqualified from aid. Reification, on the other 
hand, refers to the fact that the procedure of allotting 
persons a status that entails eligibility for assistance 
inevitably establishes new identities (of beneficiaries) 
and respective group boundaries. Due to the status 
given (refugee, IDP, documented migrant), these 
boundaries are consolidated.35  
screening tool] is offered as a guide and is not to be taken as a rigid or 
exhaustive measurement of vulnerability (United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees & International Detention Coalition, 2016, p. 3).”
34 \  UNHCR lists refugees, IDPs, people of concern and stateless persons 
as belonging to their mandate (UNHCR, 2018b).
35 \  Social identity theory suggests that the identified as well as the iden-
tifiers consolidate (any) identity markers in the course of time (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979). Hence, (any) categorisation tends to be filled with 
meaning, become a social identity and be rejected or accepted as such. 
The category will develop a life beyond its merely descriptive value.
This last chapter summarises the presented ob-
servations and contrasts them with the international 
legal–administrative practice of labelling needs and 
beneficiaries. The first subchapter scrutinises the 
shortfalls of the current categorisation process from a 
theoretical perspective. The second subchapter looks 
into the effects of these labels on the social reality 
they try to describe. It identifies a gap between the 
normative and descriptive level of categorising dis-
placement. The cause of this gap is identified as a 
top-down approach which imposes normative cate-
gories on beneficiaries rather than assessing needs 
from the bottom up. The third subchapter proposes an 
indicator model that checks the impact of displace-
ment on needs on a more descriptive level as a viable 
bottom- up alternative. This model allows humani-
tarian agencies to identify, measure and address the  
impacts of displacement quickly.
Shortfalls of ex-post categorisation
The application of the label of ‘refugee’ primarily 
depends on two variables: The political recognition  
of the category and the point in time when displaced 
people are categorised. First, countries from the Middle 
East, Pakistan to Southeast Asia that have been  
receiving refugees, have not signed the 1951 Geneva 
Refugee Convention and do, hence, officially not  
recognise refugees respectively their rights. For the 
refugees concerned, this means that the Refugee  
Convention is no sufficient condition to guarantee 
that “…the presence of refugees outside their own 
state brings them within the unconditional protective 
competence of the international community” 
(Hathaway, 2007a, p. 354). Second, the process of cate-
gorisation starts ex-post from the status the person 
attained at the time of registration and not from the 
initial point of displacement. Legal categories such as 
(international) refugee, internally displaced person 
(IDP), or person of concern therefore only apply to a 
sub-group and measure just certain effects33  rather 
33 \  UNHCR, for example is acknowledging these constraints and promoting 
awareness about them in its vulnerability screening tool: “While some 
people will be identified with several vulnerability factors, others will 
not be identified with pre-determined categories of vulnerability yet 
still be at serious risk of harm. Everyone’s circumstances are multi- 
faceted and dynamic. Hence the following framework [vulnerability 
The practice of labelling needs and beneficiaries
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that meets the needs of policy rather than social  
reality.37  As a result, humanitarian response does not 
effectively adjust its measures to changes such as the 
prevalence of protracted displacement over short-
term emergencies.
Disparities between needs and norms
The categorisation of displaced persons into  
specific groups does not only blur the commonalities 
between them but also the fact that they interrelate. 
The measures humanitarian and development agencies 
take for each specific group influence the livelihood 
strategies of individuals accordingly. The counterpro-
ductive result of the process of institutional fractioning 
is that one loses track of simultaneous developments 
as well as sequential processes and circular cumulative 
causations (Massey, 1990; Massey et al., 1993; Myrdal, 
1958). The concrete result for displaced people is that 
persons who would theoretically be eligible for aid do 
not get on the radar of humanitarian agencies—e.g. 
Syrians who stayed outside of camps before the crisis. 
In other words, not only those who (have the chance 
to) reach out for help need it. 
The legal differences between labelled groups 
have consequences for pathways of re-establishing a 
life that crucially shape the experience of displaced 
persons (Adelman & McGrath, 2007; Hathaway, 2007a; 
Karatani, 2005). However, scholars also have shown 
that displaced persons do not necessarily comply 
with the label they are categorised into but use navi-
gational skills, strategical behaviour and ‘forum shop-
ping’ strategies. This indicates that displacement does 
not imply a complete loss of agency (Benda-Beckmann, 
 
 
 
 
37 \  Scalettaris (2007, p. 37) concludes in her analysis of the international 
refugee regime: “Empirical research has demonstrated that in practice 
it is not possible to apply these definitions [of categories of people (such 
as “refugees”, “migrants”, “internally displaced persons”, “environmental 
refugees”, etc.)] to separate discrete classes of migrants. They are policy 
related labels, designed to meet the needs of policy rather than of 
scientific enquiry. Moreover, as products of a specific system, they bear 
assumptions which reflect the principles underlying the system itself”.
In Iraq, as elsewhere, consolidated labels are not 
adapted to accommodate alternative trajectories or 
alternative local categorisations of displaced persons 
(cf. migrant/refugee vs. Kurd/non-Kurd distinction in 
KRI). The consolidation of the status in combination 
with the dependency on aid inhibits political and  
social changes e.g. regarding the political status or 
rights attached to it. This relates to a much wider  
discussion on humanitarian governance in general 
(Agier, 2011; Meininghaus, 2016; Prinz & Schetter, 
forthcoming). One rather practical argument out of 
this debate is advanced by Zetter (2007). He argues that 
the dynamic between those who identify persons as 
refugees and those who are identified as refugees is a 
political issue, as the formation of the refugee label 
today mirrors the changed patterns and causes of  
globalised processes of (forced) migration that have 
occurred since the end of the Cold War. To manage 
those new and more complex processes, the “conve- 
nient label refugees” is transformed by an “institu-
tional fractioning”—a process of dividing and  
fragmenting humanitarian aid (p. 7).
This fractioning historically went hand in hand 
with a shift of policy from classical refugee programmes 
towards modern migration management and a shift 
of responsibility from NGOs towards governments 
that today have become the most important actor in 
the field (Zetter, 2007, p. 172ff.). Zetter concludes that 
the refugee label has become politicised by both the 
reproduction of institutional fractioning and by a 
wider political discourse, which is characterised by 
growing resistance to migrants and refugees. Accord-
ing to him, both processes are mostly driven by the 
interests of governments in the Global North (Zetter, 
2007).36  In sum, a politicised framework leads to a 
self-referential and, thus, partial analysis of PDD 
 
 
 
 
36 \  A well-established body of literature is available, from a more theo-
retical perspective, on the wider debate on the refugee regime and 
humanitarian government (Agamben & Hiepko, 1998; Agier, 2010; 
Betts, 2010; Calhoun, 2010; Cantor, 2019; Chimni, 2001; Nyers, 2013; 
Schetter, 2012).
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Modelling an indicator-based  
assessment
The cases presented above show that human  
dignity is the pivotal common denominator for  
assessing needs. Persons affected by displacement 
themselves referred to this point of reference for 
evaluating whether a person (including themselves) 
is in need of aid or not. “IDPs or refugees—call us 
whatever you want—but do not forget that we are all 
human beings who deserve to go home”, an Arab 
farmer from Anbar was eager to stress during an  
interview (Arbat camp, April 2016). A straightforward 
way to identify situations where humanitarian aid is 
required is, thus, to define them as situations where 
humanitarian principles are violated, or where human 
dignity and rights are in danger. To isolate causes and 
results, such a working definition then has to relate 
each specific violation of rights or dignity to the pro-
cess of displacement. The question which legal status 
or administrative label an affected person holds only 
becomes significant later. This is specifically the case 
in situations where labels that are attributed by the 
refugee regime or national policies facilitate or  
obstruct access to regaining a dignified life.
The Impoverishment Risks, Risk Management 
and Reconstruction (IRR) model systematises losses 
and difficulties related to displacement and resettle-
ment (Cernea, 2000). The model’s beauty lies in its 
common sense: Displaced persons lose certain assets 
they strive to regain—shelter, rights, livelihoods, etc. 
(cf. Box 1). The IRR approach, thus, deconstructs the 
multi-faceted displacement experience into identifi-
able components. The enlisted indicators of displace-
ment dissect the potential impacts of displacement. 
The idea of the model is not to limit displacement to 
only those situations where all indicators are checked. 
It rather helps to differentiate impacts of displacement 
on human rights and human dignity. Displaced per-
sons are neither necessarily affected by all indicators 
nor are they affected in the same way. The model is 
meant to be able to assess the level of impact for each 
1981; Berman, Quinn, & Paavola, 2014; Brees, 2008; 
Castagna & Jeyte, 2011; Smith, Boyce, & Mohammed, 
2018; Vigh, 2010). Despite the fact that legal–adminis-
trative constraints—living e.g. in a camp—have a se-
vere impact on the freedom of choice for individuals 
in such conditions, they have a certain level of agency. 
Hence, refugees are not passive victims (Bakewell, 
2010; Turner, 2016a). The legal–normative and the 
empirical–descriptive dimensions must be under-
stood to identify the needs of displaced persons and 
communities affected by displacement. 
According to the presented empirical evidence 
collected from a grassroots perspective, many similar 
characteristics are found amongst displaced persons 
across the existing divides of different labels such as 
refugees, IDPs or migrants. They all have needs in 
common that, in turn, require similar measures of 
aid (Barutciski, 1998; Rushing, 2017).38  Yet the process 
of categorisation often renders persons and their 
needs invisible (Polzer, 2008; Polzer & Hammond, 
2008). Needs do not only cut across categories but also 
vary considerably within each category. The situation 
of displaced individuals within a category, as shown 
for Iraqi IDPs, is far from homogenous. There is a  
notable difference between the need of a resourceful 
IDP who foresaw displacement, for example, and an 
IDP who lost everything (Siddiqui, Guiu, & Shwan, 
2019). The same applies to persons who crossed an 
international border and are eligible for refugee  
status: The presented cases show that some lost 
everything, and some did not. In sum, as the observed 
characteristics of persons labelled as refugee, IDPs or 
other have shown to vary considerably, it is necessary 
to take a step back and define explicitly which human 
rights violations, vulnerabilities or deprivations of 
access make the status of displaced persons one that 
requires humanitarian aid. 
38 \  Implementing agencies have already been lumping both groups 
together in needs assessments (Lyerly et al., 2000).
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We suggest that these indicators are used as a 
collection of factors—land, employment (livelihood), 
housing, social inclusion, nutrition, health, commu-
nity assets, social networks, education, legal aid,  
political rights, legal documents, human rights— 
that can measure the impact of displacement on  
individuals in a systematic way without distinguishing 
whether they belong to the categories of refugees, 
IDPs or members of receiving communities. The in-
tention is to make it possible to differentiate between 
impoverishment and heightened vulnerability in 
processes of reintegration or local integration on the 
economic, social, legal and political levels. The twist 
of our model is that indicators transcend the focus on 
persons who are legally recognised as refugees and 
avoid bias towards spatial forced migration as they do 
not stress movement. The model, thus, accommodates 
above-presented cases in which hosts and displaced 
persons (see education) faced the same needs. Rather 
than an ex-post attribution, the proposed indicators 
furthermore compile symptoms of displacement that 
help to identify the condition of individuals on the 
spot. 
In contrast to the described difficulties in differ-
entiating the diverging needs within and across the 
traditionally applied categories as in the case of 
northern Iraq, the indicator-based-approach is meant 
to work like a medical first aid kit to measure mal- 
nutrition.40  In the same way that the medical kit 
precedes treatment and reaches out to persons who 
do not make it to hospitals, the indicators enable aid 
providers to identify needs proactively. We suggest to 
assess displacement foremost as a challenge to lead-
ing a dignified life—just like malnutrition constitutes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 \  The list of indicators can, thus, be compared to the mid-upper  
arm circumference (MUAC) bracelet, which measures malnutrition. 
Regardless of the causes, the bracelet measures the level of malnutrition 
to react adequately in a simple and applicable way (Bliss et al., 2018; 
Ferro-Luzzi & James, 1996). Like any other tool, there are risks of fetish-
ising the means, which run counter to its purpose to improve a people- 
centred approach (Scott-Smith, 2013).
indicator. Moreover, the model can inform action. The 
IRR model suggests that preventing or overcoming 
the pattern of impoverishment requires targeted risk 
reversal or mitigation (Cernea, 2004). Development 
actors can adapt the IRR model as a tool to under-
stand the challenges faced in displacement and the 
conditions necessary for designing durable solutions 
(Kälin & Schrepfer, 2012). Concluding from the findings 
from empirical research in northern Iraq (see above) 
we suggest to complement the model by indicators 
j)-m).39 
39 \  The indicators represent three clusters: Access to housing/ land/ 
property; access to basic services through the provision of  
nutrition/ health/ education; and access to integration on a social/ 
economic/ political/ legal level. These indicators list the characteristics 
that define displacement without explicitly addressing human rights 
violation and life in dignity. Indirectly, however, the indicators circum-
scribe the latter: Being on the left side of the box equates massive  
human rights violations while the total of indicators on the right side 
of the table equates a life in dignity. Indicators for physical integrity or 
threats are hard to operationalise—especially in conflict areas. Therefore, 
we speak of awareness of human rights rather than access to human 
rights and access to law enforcement rather than access to security.  
It is crucial, nevertheless, to underline that our proposed model com-
bines the list of indicators with context analyses and human rights/ 
human dignity as the ultimate point of reference.
Box 1  
Measuring the levels of impact of displacement on  
access to a dignified life
a) Landlessness   access to or restitution of land 
b) Joblessness  (re)employment
c) Homelessness  permanent housing
d) Marginalisation  social inclusion
e) Food insecurity  food and nutrition security
f) Increased morbidity  improved healthcare
g) Loss of common  Restauration of community  
property   assets and services
h) Social disarticulation (re)building of networks and 
   communities, reconciliation 
i) Loss of educational  access to education 
opportunities
j) Outlawed  access to legal representation and  
   law enforcement
k) Voiceless  access to political recognition and   
   representation
l) Undocumented  holding valid legal documents,  
   property titles, certificates 
m) Unaware  awareness of (human) rights
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a challenge to health (Ferro-Luzzi & James, 1996, p. 7). 
Malnutrition is not cured by nutrition alone but by 
an accompanying coherent treatment; in the same 
way characteristics of displacement need to be ad-
dressed in a disaggregated yet holistic way aiming to 
secure human rights and protection. 
In the case of northern Iraq, this means to take 
historical, political, socio-cultural and economic dy-
namics much more into account. The comprehensive 
list of indicators of displacement dynamics, derived 
from bottom-up observations of needs and vulnera-
bilities related to displacement,41  enable the analysis 
to dissect and assess effects that are potentially, and 
to various degrees, detrimental to a life in dignity. 
The idea is, in sum, to enable humanitarian agencies 
to identify, measure and address the impacts of dis-
placement quickly. 
41 \  For the sake of brevity, this Paper does not discuss all indicators in 
detail. Ideally though, each indicator and its bandwidth would need to 
be checked against local circumstances. The general idea is to demons-
trate the advantages of starting with a needs assessment that is mea-
sured against the ideal of human dignity over starting from a category 
of people and then assess their needs irrespective of the wider context.
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At the beginning of the Paper, we posed the ques-
tion whether the process of categorisation and desig-
nation of beneficiaries efficiently identifies the needs 
of displaced persons or whether it carries elements of 
exclusion and reification in it, which lead to ineffi-
ciencies. The guideline for humanitarian aid is to 
focus on people and to alleviate their suffering as 
quickly, impartially, independently, neutrally and 
with respect for human dignity as possible (see EU, 
2008, p.1). The "analysis of the needs ... [is] the corner-
stone of the humanitarian programme in all cases" 
(EU, 2008, p. 12). Yet in practice, the presented cases 
have shown that not all persons with similar protec-
tion needs are guaranteed equal access to assistance. 
Those who have not sought assistance and are, there-
fore, not registered or those who are not eligible for 
aid dedicated to refugees (e.g. IDPs) or vice versa are 
excluded by default or at least should be excluded 
(see above). 
According to the cases in Iraq, the decisive  
moment that defined the need for aid was neither 
correlating with the question whether regular or  
irregular migration routes were open to those affected 
nor whether they fled across or to the border (which 
might not have existed at the time) nor whether they 
received support or not, nor whether they carried 
documents with them. The discussed examples from 
northern Iraq show that persons categorised into dif-
ferent status might share the same needs while those 
in the same category might have different needs. The 
cases have also shown that needs are not entirely  
determined by the question whether a displaced person 
has to resort to regular or irregular migratory move-
ments, whether a status is recognised or refused, and 
by the question which quality the legal status has in 
the transit or destination country—yet the cases also 
showed that there is a critical influence (cf. documen-
tation, nutrition, rights). 
The cases demonstrate that beneficiaries often 
move in and out of categories or move between them. 
Persons who would qualify for aid do not request it at 
a certain moment of time—but might request it at 
another one. The examples showed that migrants 
became refugees when the situation in the place of 
origin changed or when the economic context 
changed, because their houses were destroyed and 
their families fled or because they lost their jobs and 
had to move to a camp to save costs.42  The economy 
and degree of social inclusion in northern Iraq mostly 
changed because the same conditions that led to the 
displacement of Syrians spread into KRI. This shows 
that needs cannot be assessed without looking at the 
wider context. The examples also disclosed that needs 
regarding land, employment (livelihood), housing, 
social inclusion, nutrition, health, community assets, 
social networks, education, legal aid, political rights, 
legal documents and human rights vary widely within 
and across the categories of migrant, refugee, IDP, 
and even receiving communities.
We, accordingly, propose to apply an indicator- 
based-approach that allows measuring the level of 
impact, hence vulnerability, of displaced persons as 
the primary determinants of needs—regardless of 
their status. Using the indicator-based model enables 
aid agencies to measure needs against the level of 
impact in each case.43  This means that symptoms  
are evaluated on a bandwidth from no access to full 
access—and not in relation to the state of affairs  
before displacement. The point of reference in the 
indicator model as in the everyday perception of dis-
placed persons (cf. above) is access to a dignified life. 
As long as this is not fully given, e.g. in the case of a 
return to misery, access would only be partially re-
stored.44  The indicator model, thus, would establish 
an inter-subjectively comprehensible catalogue in a 
way that political and legal definitions of displace-
ment and solutions cannot provide yet. The models 
would enable humanitarian and development actors 
to centre around dignified life as the main point of 
reference by evaluating outcomes of aid against an 
ideal state where human rights are respected and no 
well-founded fear for persecution is given.
42 \  Other cases show that such similarities are also found in displacement 
en situ, acute spatial displacement, post-displacement periods (e.g. in 
exile or transit), or return (Rudolf, forthcoming)
43 \  This means that e.g. not the fact of losing access to land as such defines 
the impact of displacement but the question of how much land, which 
quality of land, or which use it was dedicated to.
44 \  It can still be counted as a restoration of limited access as before, 
though. The difference is, just as with malnutrition, that a clearly  
defined ideal state is used as a fixed point of reference.
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The Working Paper, in sum, proposes a fresh look 
on how to assess the impact of internal displacement 
and the major challenges related to refugee move-
ments. The empirical findings suggest that any 
indicator-based-approach must be combined with an 
analysis of the socio-political and historical context 
of forced migration and also pay attention to impacts 
on the host society. Being aware of the fact that it is 
inevitable for humanitarian and development aid in 
a situation of crisis to prioritise some issues (and  
disregard others), the context and the cases presented 
here demonstrate that there is still no alternative for 
a holistic approach. This means that any assessment 
of needs has to start from a long-term, multi-sectoral, 
whole-of-society, and systematically indicator-based 
approach. 
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